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Report of the Committee on
International Economic Organizations*
Congressional Action on
International Financial Organizations
MICHAEL S. SHAW,

Chairmant

Since the passage of the Foreign Assistance (and Related Programs) Appropriations Act in March of 1975, Congress has had little direct involvement with
international financial institutions. The institutions themselves, however, have
been quite busy in the past three months.
Both the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World
Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have been seeking to adapt to
the advent of historically high oil prices, the presence of world wide inflation and
the, general economic downturn in the developed countries.
In a June meeting, the Development Committee of the World Bank and the
IMF (formally the Joint Ministerial Committee of the Boards of Governors of the
World Bank and the Fund on the Transfer of Real Resources to the Developing
Countries) approved the creation of a new World Bank lending facility informally
known as the "Third Window." At present, the World Bank makes "hard term"
loans at roughly the market rates of interest and highly concessionary loans
through its International Development Association or soft loan window. The
so-called Third Window or Interest Subsidy Fund would set its interest rates
somewhere between the 81/2 percent hard loans and 3 of 1 percent soft loans.
World Bank President McNamara has proposed a $1 billion level of lending for
the Third Window. At that rate of lending, a 41/2 percent interest rate would
require between $225 and $285 million in subsidy funds. As of the end of July,
$117 million had been committed to the subsidy fund by various oil exporters,
Canada and a few European nations. Neither France, Germany nor the United
States, however, made an initial pledge to support the Third Window. To some
extent this denoted uncertainty about the eventual use of proceeds from the pro*October 16, 1975. The views expressed herein are those of the individual contributors and not
necessarily those of the Committee.
tMember of the law firm of Foss, Schuman & Drake, Chicago, Illinois.

InternationalLawyer, Vol. 10, No. I

206

INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

posed sale of IMF gold. In the case of the United States, Secretary Simon indicated that American reluctance also reflected the difficulties of getting such a
proposal through the Congress.
Although the Third Window is more likely to help those countries too rich for
the concessionary loans and too encumbered to take on the hard loans, it may
provide some assistance to the poorest countries as well. But, more adequate
World Bank help for the least developed countries, however, will probably
depend more on an eventual increase in lending of the IDA. At the annual joint
meeting of the World Bank and the IMF, McNamara proposed just that. Noting
that the fourth replenishment of the IDA would be fully committed by fiscal 1977,
he urged member governments to move quickly on negotiations to establish a fifth
replenishment. He also proposed both a selective (designed for the OPEC countries) and a general increase in the World Bank's subscribed and paid-in capital.
With the demise of the Bretton-Woods system of fixed exchange rates in
August of 1971, the IMF has been deeply involved in the on-going discussions on
international monetary reform. Inflation, recession and high oil prices have
focused attention more and more on the problems of those countries that encountered serious balance of payments difficulties (often referred to as the Most
Seriously Affected or MSAs). In addition to its compensatory finance facility, the
IMF moved to establish a special oil facility to help the poorer nations make the
transition to higher fuel, fertilizer and food prices. In September, at the joint
meeting with the World Bank, the IMF indicated that a partial sale of its gold
holdings would be forthcoming. Proceeds from this sale would be deposited in a
Special Trust Fund for the use of the developing countries.
The United States has been an active participant in negotiations that led to the
new World Bank and IMF policies. In a speech delivered before the joint World
Bank-IMF meeting, Secretary of the Treasury Simon endorsed the creation of a
Special Trust Fund in the IMF to take the place of the previous oil facility. He also
suggested that the existing compensatory finance facility be replaced by a development security fund that would aid the developing countries suffering from
widely fluctuating export earnings. Secretary Simon specifically proposed the
development security fund as an alternative to the creation of commodity cartels
to stabilize world prices and thus export earnings.
In the same speech, the Secretary "pledged" American support for a "major
expansion" of the International Finance Corporation (IFC). Although part of the
World Bank Group, the IFC makes loans principally to encourage growth in the
private sector. The Secretary saw a major role for the IFC not only in stimulating
local entrepreneurs but in acting as an intermediary between local concerns and
governments and international companies.
Like the World Bank, the IMF has also moved to increase the participation of
the OPEC countries. In recognition of their vastly increased financial reserves,
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the quotas and thus the voting power of the OPEC nations will increase from 5 to
10 percent of the IMF total. The change will reduce the U.S. voting power to 20
percent-or just less than the amount necessary to veto a major IMF decision. To
preserve the U.S. veto, the agreement to increase the OPEC share contains an
amendment to the IMF Articles increasing the needed majority from 80 to 85
percent.
None of this directly involves the Congress. But among the welter of proposals
presented at the World Bank/Fund meeting (and at the Special Session of the
United Nations in New York) there are many that will demand Congressional approval. American participation in a fifth IDA replenishment would require traditional authorizing and appropriating action now made more complex by the new
budgetary review process. Although generally supportive of the IDA, the current
administration has been increasingly critical of the World Bank for not pressing
the OPEC nations to contribute to the IDA. In fact, the administration contends
that any increase in bank quotas (and thus voting power) should be matched by
proportional contributions to the IDA. Of the OPEC members with the largest
reserves and the smallest populations, only Kuwait currently contributes to the
IDA. The other Arab nations with sizable surpluses prefer to give bilateral
assistance-primarily to fellow Arab or Muslim states.
The issue of Arab contributions to IDA could easily become caught up with
charges of World Bank favoritism to Arab states. Although bank officials deny it,
charges have been made that the World Bank does not press Arab states to accept
Bank staff representatives that are Jewish. Israel has recently added fuel to this
particular fire by seeking a $40 million loan for water conservation and general
economic development. World Bank officials had indicated last May that Israel
would no longer qualify for bank loans because of its high per capita income. The
Israelis plan to press their case-arguing that an overvalued exchange rate and a
necessarily high level of military expenditures greatly reduce the actual "national
welfare per capita." Regardless of the moral or economic merits of this argument,
the combination of Arab recalcitrance on the IDA issue, Israeli pressure of
continued World Bank support and the powerful catalyst of a U.S. presidential
election could embroil the Congress in serious and possibly acrimonious debate
about future IDA contributions.
Congressional action would also be necessary for increased support for the IFC
and the development security fund. Any increase in general World Bank quotas
would similarly require congressional authorization and appropriation. In particular, the IFC proposal might precipitate extensive debate over the proper role
in development of the U.S.-based multinational corporation.
John R. Stark
Washington, D.C.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 10. No. 1
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Council on International Economic Policy
The Council on International Economic Policy was created by the President in
1971, and given statutory authority by Congress in 1972, to coordinate the
formulation of international economic policy within the Executive Branch. It is
composed of the members of the Cabinet who deal with international economic
matters: The Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, Agriculture, Commerce,
Labor, and Transportation. In addition, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, and the CIEP Executive Director are
members. CIEP's primary responsibilities are to coordinate the formulation of
international economic policies, to develop consistency between domestic and
foreign economic policy, and to provide for a close coordination with basic foreign
policy objectives. Additionally, CIEP prepares the President's annual International Economic Report.
Recently, CIEP established an inter-agency task force to study ocean shipping
issues, particularly with respect to the impact of current international arrangements and agreements on the liner trade. The task force is now studying pooling
agreements and equal access agreements between government and non-government entities. The study will evaluate the effects of the agreements on rates, the
quality of service, the impact of such agreements on the volume and value of
trades covered, the potential impact of extending such agreements to additional
U.S. trades including effects on freight rates, trade volumes and U.S. carrier
shares, and the effects of such agreements on third-flag participation in U.S.
trades. Additionally, the task force is reviewing shipper and consignee reactions
to the agreements and the attitudes of other major trading countries in the industrialized world, particularly within the OECD, toward such agreements. The
findings of the study will be compared to participation by carriers in the cargo of a
major trade where no such agreements presently exist. It is anticipated that this
study will be concluded within about two months.
CIEP is actively involved in the development of United States proposals for an
international grain reserves system. Twice in the last five years, significant and
unexpected shortfalls in world grain production have substantially reduced the
world food supply. As a result, prices have fluctuated widely, both at home and
abroad, and trade patterns among producing and consuming countries have
changed in important ways. Generally, the nations hardest hit are the poorest
countries in the world who can least afford to pay high prices for scarce supplies of
food.
In an effort to improve food security, the United States has proposed and the
World Food Conference accepted a resolution calling for an international system
of nationally held grain reserves to be established. The intent is to establish reserve stocks which are large enough to substantially offset production shortfalls
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in foodgrains. We have proposed a reserve of 30 million tons of wheat and rice,
and we believe a reserve of this size would be sufficient to offset about 90 percent
of potential production shortfalls.
A formula will be determined to establish the responsibility for holding grain
reserves among the participants. The United States has asserted that only those
countries who participate in holding grain reserves would be assured of the right
to draw from the reserves. Special assistance would be provided for developing
countries to enable them to meet their obligations to hold a portion of world
reserves.
The United States submitted its proposals in a conference of the International
Wheat Council Preparatory Group on September 29 and 30. Members of the
International Wheat Council are now considering the U.S. proposal within their
own governments, and preparing for the next meeting which is tentatively
scheduled for late October. CIEP has commissioned a study on grain reserves
which is now being prepared by The Rand Corporation and will be published by
CIEP within the next two months.
David A. Hartquist
Washington, D.C.
Export-Import Bank of the United States
William J. Casey, Chairman, has announced his resignation effective as of an
uncertain future date. At this writing, his successor has not been named.
The resignation follows the naming of two new Executive Vice Presidents (although not Board members), Matthew E. Tutino and David 0. Beim. Beim, a
young former Vice President of The First Boston Corporation, will be in charge of
project lending and guarantees. Tutino, formerly an international Vice President
of Lockheed Electronics Company, will have responsibility for exporter credits,
the FCIA program, discount loans and the administrative side of the Bank.
Chairman Casey has also announced a new interest rate policy intended to
reduce the interest rate subsidy which has drawn criticism from the Congress.
The Bank has adopted a presumptive interest rate schedule for its own loans
varying from 8 / to 91/2 percent depending upon the term of the loan, as follows:
Total Term of Loan
(including grace period)
under 6 years
6-8 years
8-10 years
10-12 years
12-14 years
over 14 years
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 10, No. I
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These presumptive rates will be lowered as necessary to meet foreign competition, provided that the blend of Eximbank and commercial bank rates for a particular package does not fall below 71/2 percent.
This policy, however, raises a major difficulty for the Bank: determining accurately the rate quoted by foreign competition. Generally speaking, the Bank
does not obtain this information by direct contact with its foreign counterparts.
And information obtained by U.S. exporters from their potential buyers is
suspect since it is in the buyer's interest as part of its own bargaining to quote
other rates as low as possible. Moreover, even assuming good faith by the buyer,
determination of the effective rate may be difficult because foreign export credit
institutions have a variety of additional charges and because the amount of credit
as a percentage of the export varies markedly. Thus Eximbank loans may cover
from 30 to 55 percent of the export, while competitive export institutions often go
as high as 85 percent. The Bank's problem in determining competitive interest
may well put U.S. sellers in an even more difficult position, in a world in which the
buyers' decisions between competitive sellers is often made on the basis of the best
credit terms. How sellers will be able, under the new Exim policy, to fix interest
rates which they can quote remains to be determined.
True to its announcement last February, Exim has increased its percentage of
involvement in particular financings. Exim loans of 45 percent of the U.S. export
have again become common, although frequently (but not universally) the 45
percent which is privately financed is without Eximbank guarantee. On occasion,
however, Exim has recently lent and guaranteed as much as 90 percent of the
transaction, and it has showed imagination in determining its role. For example,
a recent $20 million export credit to a private borrower in Korea included a down
payment of 15 percent of the U.S. export price, and Eximbank loan of 35 percent,
and a private loan covering 50 percent, of which Exim guaranteed 70 percent (or
35 percent of the total). Mixes of this type, tailored to the needs of the particular
credit, appear to be the order of the day.
Stephen B. Ives, Jr.
Washington, D.C.
General Agreement On Tariffs and Trade
MultilateralTrade Negotiations (MTN)
TNC Meeting. The Trade Negotiation Committee (TNC), composed of highranking representatives of the countries participating in the current round of
multilateral trade negotiations, met in Geneva on July 15 and 16, 1975. The TNC
has responsibility for overall supervision of the MTN, and at the July meeting the
Committee assessed the work accomplished in the first five months of the negotiations. Each of the six working groups established by the TNC at its February,
1975 meeting has held at least two sets of meetings. So far, the working groups
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 10, No. 1
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have largely concentrated on discussing negotiating procedures or goals and
establishing work programs. TNC Chairman Olivier Long has expressed his wish
that more substantial progress be made beginning in September after the
summer recess. There was a general commitment on the part of delegations
present at the TNC to work for rapid advancement of substantive negotiations in
the coming months.
Many developing countries expressed sharp disappointment during the TNC
meeting at what they considered to be a lack of progress and positive response by
the developed countries to their proposals for the development of "differential
measures" favoring LDC's. These countries have sought a rapid definition of
such differential treatment, which they view as an important factor in their
continuing MTN participation.
The United States was represented at the July TNC meeting by Ambassador
Frederick B. Dent, the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations. In his opening statement to the TNC, Ambassador Dent urged the Committee to assign to the working groups the task of identifying "interim concrete results" which might be completed in the coming year. Such results could take a
number of different forms-for example, a framework of negotiations in a
specific area; a set of detailed objectives; a draft text, with disputed language left
in brackets; a partial, interim or ad referendum agreement; or the implementation of agreed measures. Ambassador Dent noted that a considerable amount of
preparatory work had already been done in the area of nontariff measures and
suggested, in particular, examination of how that preparation could be used to
achieve some early tangible results in the negotiations; early results might be possible, for example, with respect to a standards code. Ambassador Dent indicated
that the Congressional advisors to the delegation shared the Administration's
view that interim concrete results are important to maintain momentum in the
MTN and also to demonstrate that Congressional procedures for approval of
certain agreements are workable.
Working Groups. During the first phase of the negotiations (from February
through July 1975), the Working Group on Tariffs considered nine different proposals and hypotheses for an overall tariff-cutting formula, as well as a number of
specific proposals tabled by developing countries for improvement of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and differential treatment for LDCs in the
tariff negotiations. The Group will meet again in mid-October, to continue its
efforts to reach agreement on a tariff negotiating plan.
The Group on Nontariff Measures (NTMs), drawing on work accomplished
during the pre-negotiating stage, has begun to deal with specific negotiation
problems. During the first negotiating phase, the Nontariff Measures Group
achieved agreement on a draft Standards Code as a basis for future negotiations;
scheduled bilateral consultations on quantitative restrictions; agreed to table
specific proposals for a subsidies and countervailing duty code during the Fall
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 10, No. 1
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work program; and developed general support for a United States proposal to
abolish consular formalities and fees. The next meeting of the Nontariff Measures Group will be held the week of October 13. Meetings of subgroups of the
NTM Group are scheduled as follows: Technical Barriers to Trade (Standards),
week of September 22; Customs Matters, week of October 6; Quantitative
Restrictions, week of October 27; Subsidies/Countervailing Duties, week of
November 10.
In the Sectors Group, the United States has suggested that studies of the data
necessary for a sector negotiating approach be undertaken for chemicals, iron
and steel, aluminum, electronics, and electrical machinery. The Group agreed to
a study by the GATT Secretariat on ferrous and nonferrous ores and metals: this
Secretariat study will be examined at the Group's next meeting, scheduled for
November 3. Other delegations in the Sectors Group have, however, strongly
opposed the preparation of further GATT sector studies. As a compromise, the
Secretariat will prepare more limited "feasibility studies" in the other three areas
suggested by the United States.
The results of the Working Groups' efforts during the "second negotiating
phase" will be reviewed by the TNC at its next meeting in December.

U.S. Trade Preparations
The Trade Policy Staff Committee concluded its public hearings on the MTN
and GSP on August 8, 1975, and a summary of the hearings has been submitted
to the President. The TPSC will hold a second set of public hearings on September 1S and 17 to receive views specifically on the four categories of NTM's currently under discussion in the Geneva trade talks. (40 Fed. Reg. 34649, Aug. 18,
1975.)
The final reports of the Industry Sector Advisory Committees, the Agriculture
Technical Advisory Committees, and the Labor Sector Advisory Committees are
in the process of being completed for submission to the Industry, Agricultural,
and Labor Policy Advisory Committees, respectively.
At the beginning of the year, the Commerce Department established 26 Industry Sector Advisory Committees (ISACs), representing various manufacturing sectors of the U.S. economy. Recently, Commerce established a 27th ISAC,
which will include representatives of large and small retail establishments. This
will be the first advisory committee to include representatives of U.S. businesses
having a principal interest in imports. The first meeting of the Industry Sector
Advisory Committee on Retailing will be held on September 29, 1975. (40 Fed.
Reg. 37243, Aug. 26, 1975.)
Stephen L. Gibson
Washington, D.C.
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International Monetary Fund (IMF)
The Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund (hereinafter
sometimes referred to as the Fund) held their Annual Meeting during the period
September 1-5, 1975. Developments during that meeting regarding (a) exchange
arrangements among the Fund's members, and (b) the future role of gold may be
noted.
Exchange Arrangements
On August 15, 1971, the United States suspended convertibility of the dollar
into other reserve assets. With that event the lynch-pin of the international
monetary system which was devised at Bretton Woods disappeared despite subsequent efforts of returning to a system of fixed exchange rates. These efforts
involved a realignment of exchange rates following the meeting of ministers of
finance at the Smithsonian Institution on December 18, 1971, including the
devaluation of the U.S. dollar effective May 8, 1972, and the second devaluation
of the dollar initiated by the United States and effective on October 18, 1973.
Under the Bretton Woods system a member was obliged to establish a par value
for its currency directly or indirectly in terms of gold. The member, moreover,
was obliged to ensure that all exchange transactions between its currency and the
currency of another member would take place within specified margins around
the parity rate.
With continued depreciation of the value of the United States dollar in foreign
exchange markets after the second devaluation, an early return to a system of
fixed exchange rates appeared unlikely. Currency floated, that is to say, the
monetary authorities no longer ensured that rates of exchange would take place
within the specified margins.
In these circumstances, the Fund at its 1973 Annual Meeting set in train the
study of a number of issues relating to a reform of the International Monetary
System, including appropriate amendments to the Fund's Articles of Agreement.
Among those issues were the legalization of floating and the role of gold. A
separate note on the general question of amendments of the Fund's Articles is
contemplated for a later issue of The InternationalLawyer.
At the recent Annual Meeting of the Fund's Board of Governors, the Managing
Director addressed himself to the problem of the exchange rate regime which is at
the forefront of the Fund's responsibilities. He took note of the disagreement
among the Fund's members as to the relative weight to be assigned to par values,
on the one hand, and to floating, on the other. After noting some of the pros and
cons of each approach, as well as the experience since March 1973, he concluded
In light of these considerations, it seems to me that we would be wise to adopt an
amendment of our Articles of Agreement that would allow the exchange system to
develop in the manner best suited to evolving circumstances. When the existing
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 10, No. I
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inflationary climate recedes, when the magnitude of payments disequilibria is reduced,
and when the effects of recent shocks to the system are absorbed, greater stability in the
pattern of exchange rates by more coordinated management should be a realistic
possibility. If at some time a sufficient number of Fund members wish to-return to some
form of par value system, the amended Articles should permit this; equally, scope must
be left for countries to adopt floating or some other arrangement, provided they observe
the relevant guidelines. All members, floating and nonfloating alike, should adhere to
rules of the game, which will need to be worked out more specifically than has been
possible so far. In this way, we will have a system which responds to the needs of
individual countries, while continuing to assert the primacy of the general interest in a
matter which concerns the welfare of all.
It is worthy of note that Mr. Alfred Hayes, who recently retired as President of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, in delivering an address at the 1975 Per
Jacobsson lecture program held on the eve of the Fund's Annual Meeting,
reached conclusions along the same lines as those expounded by the Fund's
Managing Director.
Further consideration to seek a consensus on an appropriate exchange rate
regime will be undertaken in the decision-making organs of the Fund. Hope was
expressed that the Interim Committee of the Board of Governors on the International Monetary System, at its meeting scheduled for January, 1976 in Jamaica, will arrive at a consensus on the future exchange arrangements that
should be adopted by the Fund.
The Role of Gold
The question of the future role of gold has been the subject of considerable
discussion in the Fund. Over recent years gold has played a lessened role in the
international monetary system. Consideration is presently being given to a further reduction in that role. The Interim Committee referred to above met in
Washington, D.C., on August 31, 1975 and among other things considered the
question of the role of gold. Their conclusions were reflected in a press communique'. In it the Committee recommended, inter alia:
...provision should be made for:
1. Abolition of an official price for gold.
2. Elimination of the obligation to use gold in transactions with the Fund, and
elimination of the Fund's authority to accept gold in transactions unless the Fund so
decides by an 85 percent majority. This understanding would be without prejudice to
the study of a Gold Substitution Account.
3. Sale of 1/6 of the Fund's gold (25 million ounces) for the benefit of developing
countries without resulting in a reduction of other resources for their benefit, and
restitution of 1/6 of the Fund's gold to members. The proportion of any profits or
surplus value of the gold sold for the benefit of developing countries would be
transferred directly to each developing country in proportion to its quota. The rest of
the Fund's gold would be subject to provisions in an amendment of the Articles that
would create enabling powers exercisable by an 85 percent majority of the total voting
power.
InternationalLawyer,Vol. 10, No. 1
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The Committee's recommendations for further reducing the role of gold in the
international monetary system will now have to be considered in the appropriate
decision-making organs of the Fund.
Albert S. Gerstein
Washington, D.C.
Recent Developments In OECD
The OECD is now seriously considering the role of transnational or multinational enterprise (TNEs or MNEs) within its member countries. It has adopted a
package work program on TNE issues consisting of standards of behavior for the
guidance of TNEs, the national treatment of TNEs, and a guideline on investment incentives and disincentives. The primary focus is on the drafting and adoption of a code of conduct of transnational enterprises.
To that end, the OECD Investment Committee has established a drafting committee. The committee, in which the United States has played a quite active role,
is in the process of negotiating an extensive code of conduct which would govern
TNE activities in member countries. Its most recent session was held in Paris
during the first week of October.
This Code of Conduct, as it is evolving, would not impose new obligations with
the force of law on transnational enterprises. It does, however, impose initially
certain "moral" obligations on all member countries which may induce them to
enforce the guidelines upon their multinational corporations. Moreover, the
Code, as it is presently drafted, includes a policy of harmonization of local "legislation in important fields relevant to the activities of MNEs."
Important provisions of the Code as now drafted would require the disclosure
and publication of data concerning multinational enterprises' worldwide activities ". .. in addition to what may be required by law and custom in the individual countries in which they operate ....
together with a breakdown of such
information according to the country of establishment . . ." This information
would include identification of all affiliated companies within a multinational
enterprise including their relationship with each other, and data concerning turnover and purchases of goods and services, including intra-group transactions,
profits, employees, wages and salaries, and "the policies of the enterprise with
respect to intra-group pricing and the provision of finance."
In addition to general language requiring multinational enterprises to comply
with social and economic policies of the host countries in which they operate, the
Code also provides that: MNEs "refrain from actions which would adversely affect competition by abusing or unduly enhancing situations of market power" by
a variety of specified means; MNEs refrain from the use of discriminatory
pricing, including pricing transactions between affiliated enterprises, "which
would adversely affect competition outside these enterprises"; MNEs should
International Lawyer, VoL 10, No. 1
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allow purchasers, distributors, licensees, minority-owned subsidiaries, and when
competitively important, wholly-owned subsidiaries, the maximum freedom to
resell, export, purchase and develop their operations ... ; MNEs should refrain
from participating in or cooperating with ". . . cartels or restrictive agreements
which adversely affect or eliminate free competition or which are not authorized
under national or international legislation . . ."; and MNEs should provide
national authorities with data concerning restrictive business practices.
The Code covers the area of labor law, by providing for rights of representation of employees, the obligations of MNEs to negotiate with employees, and the
provision of information to employees with regard to MNEs operations "as is
necessary for meaningful collective bargaining." MNEs are urged to consult with
employee organizations "in considering changes in their operations which would
affect the livelihood of their employees..."
The Code would also, as presently drafted, require MNEs to adopt "practices
which would permit the rapid diffusion of technologies within the context of
established measures for the protection of intellectual industrial property
rights."
It is expected that a final draft Code of Conduct will be released by the OECD
by the spring of 1976. The OAS and the United Nations are also working on
similar codes of conduct. The U.S. State Department has established an Advisory
Committee on Transnational Enterprise to study the development of these codes
of conduct, as well as the entire range of issues concerning transnational enterprises.
D. J. Plaine
Washington, D.C.
Report on the Seventh Special Session of the
United Nations General Assembly
The Seventh Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly was
called in December, 1973 by the 28th Assembly in the atmosphere of tension
caused by the "Yom Kippur" war, oil embargo and explosion in crude oil prices.
Held from September 1-16, 1975 on "Development and International Economic
Co-operation," it did not repeat the now familiar scene of accusation and confrontation many had expected.
There were several reasons: virtual pre-emption of the field on the first day by
Kissinger's speech (read by Ambassador Moynihan), 28 of whose proposals and
policy recommendations were included, in one form or another, in the final
Report; the policy of detente which to an important degree removed the European
Communist bloc from the confrontation equation; and the real desperation of
many African and other non-oil-producing nations and their disenchantment
with the oil-pricing policies of OPEC third-world countries.
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The following was the agenda, prepared by ECOSOC:
* International Trade
* Transfer of Real Resources for Financing the Development of Developing
Countries and International Monetary Reforms
* Science and Technology
* Industrialization
* Food and Agriculture
* Restructuring of the Economic and Social Sectors of the United Nations
System
"Debate," consisting entirely of position statements by delegates of some 108
member nations, was conducted in Plenary Session; but the real work was
conducted, simultaneously, in an ad hoc committee of the whole appointed by the
Assembly.
The committee's Report, as a whole, was unanimous, although the United
States and others indicated reservations to certain provisions, and was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly which took no implementative action,
but resolved:
to set in motion the following measures as the basis and framework for the work of the
competent bodies and organizations of the United Nations system.
These include the (present) 30th General Assembly; GATT; the proposed world
energy conference; UNCTAD; and special intergovernmental commissions.
InternationalTrade
In addition to general language regarding expansion, improvement and diversification of the trade and productivity of the developing countries and of their
manufacturing and raw material processing capabilities, the resolution's
specifics include:
1. Securing stable remuneration and equitable prices for commodities, by
international stocking, long-term multilateral trade agreements, and other forms
of market arrangements 1 , and providing adequate international financing therefor.
One concept of stocking intended to help set stable price parameters for commodities, envisions an internationally financed and controlled authority establishing storage facilities for "buffer stocks" of various commodities, and maintaining continuing offers to all parties to buy a given commodity at price "X"
(say, $90) and to sell it at price "Y" (say, $110).
2. Expanding and improving compensatory financing of exports both by

'Not specifically mentioned are producer cartels (e.g.. OPEC); but the virtually unanimous
endorsement of the "Lima Declaration" (see Industrialization, below) leaves no doubt that this is
intended.
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existing means and through the new $10 billion Development Security Facility of
the IMF proposed by the United States to stabilize overall export earnings.
Compensatory financing involves making balance-of-payment reserve credits
available to a country facing trade deficits caused by a decline (from agreed trend
averages) in the value of its exports. Present availability of such credits from IMF
is stringent and does not favor developing countries. The credits would be made
available by IMF either as grants or low-interest loans, and would be in addition
to the country's normal IMF quota.'
It should be noted that both in the case of stocking arrangements and in the
determination of export values, the developing countries favor an "integrated"
approach involving all commodities, while the United States favors a' commodity-by-commodity" approach.
3. Preserving the purchasing power of the developing countries, especially by
"indexation" (linking their raw material prices to the prices of manufactured
products imported by them). The United States is opposed, but has agreed to join
in a study of the subject. Firm proposals are to be made at the Fourth Session of
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) at its May,
1976 meeting in Nairobi.
4. On a preferential basis for developing countries, reducing or removing nontariff barriers within a framework of multilateral commitments, and limiting
countervailing duties to the extent possible. (The United States has announced
that on January 1, 1976 new reduced tariffs go into effect on a preference basis for
developing country manufactured products.)
S. Improving the share of developing countries in the transport, marketing
and distribution of their primary commodities.
Transfer of Real Resources for Financing the
Development of Developing Countries and
International Monetary Reforms
Transfer of Resources
The insistence on transfer of wealth from developed countries to developing
ones arises from the third world's accusation that
the prosperity of the West is derived, in large part, from draining the wealth and
exploiting the labour of the peoples of the third world,3

'Under the Rome Convention signed in February, 1975 between the EEC and some 46 developing
countries, a special fund is being set up to stabilize export earnings of developing countries by
providing loans and grants.
3
Opening address to the Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly by its President, Mr.
Abdelaziz Bouteflika (Algeria).
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and that the West therefore has an obligation to return to the developing
countries massive amounts of resources.
Such massive transfers are unlikely to be acceptable to the West while there is
widespread belief that the money will not reach the small farmer or mineworker,
but will end up in the pockets of government officials, brokers and middlemen.
As Professor Gardner has said:
The people of the United States and of other industrialized countries are not interested
in transferring wealth from the poor people in the rich countries to the rich people in the
poor countries.'
Great pressures to admit "guilt," followed by concessions amounting (in the
words of Ambassador Moynihan) to "plea bargaining," were rejected by the
United States.
Highlights of the resolutions in this area follow:
1. Developed countries confirm their commitment to previously targeted
"official" development assistance aims, and in particular, .7 percent of their
annual GNP. Express reservation to any official fixed figure was made by the
United States. The U.S. figure last year was probably under .3 percent, and the
State Department feels that the political base for so large an increase does not
exist at this time.
2. Establishment in the IMF of a "link" between SDRs and development assistance under which SDR reserves would automaticallybe allocated to developing countries for development purposes, in addition to those allocated for
liquidity needs. The United States is opposed, believing that any abuse of the
"link" would play havoc with the international monetary system. On the last day
of the ad hoc committee meetings, the EEC countries reluctantly yielded to pressures and accepted the principle. (This seems to have caused a political hubbub in
Germany.)
3. Establishment of a $2 billion Trust Fund to benefit developing countries, to
be financed partly by IMF gold sales.'
4. Substantial increase in the capital of the World Bank Group to make additional capital available for development financing. The United States has proposed an increase in the capital of the World Bank's International Finance Corporation from its present $100 million to at least $400 million.
5. Granting developing countries increased access, on favorable terms, to the
capital markets of the developed countries, with particular emphasis on the work
being done by the joint development committee of the IMF and the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Structures for Economic Interdependence," p.53 (The Institute on Man and Science,
Rensselaerville, New York, May, 1975).
'The IMF finance ministers agreed in September to sell one-sixth of the Fund's gold reserves on
the free market to raise funds for the Trust Fund.
4'New
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6. Study of the International Investment Trust, proposed by the United
States, to mobilize government portfolio and private capital for investment in
local enterprise. A $200 million loss-reserve would protect investors.

InternationalMonetary Reform
In addition to expanding and liberalizing compensatory financing facilities
(see International Trade, above), the resolution has two basic aims:
(a) Reduction of the role of national currencies as international reserves, and
their replacement by the Special Drawing Right (SDR)' as the central reserve
asset of the international monetary system. The United States is not opposed, but
feels it inappropriate to single out targets for reform in the absence of agreement
on the entire international monetary system.
(b) Increased participation by the developing countries in the decision-making
process of the organs of international finance and development. The United
States believes in an "evolving" role for developing nations.
Many attribute the post-war international inflation to the fact that the United
States and other industrialized countries can fund their IMF quota requirements by issuing more national currency, and control the decision making as to
each country's entitlement. During the five-year period 1970-74, the developed
countries received 97 percent of the international reserve credits made available
by IMF, leaving the developing countries in an increasingly desperate situation
with regard to importation of goods, food and petroleum.
The developed countries have about 73 percent of present IMF voting rights
(upon which reserve quotas are based), and the developing countries 27 percent
(of which OPEC nations have about 5 percent). Similar arrangements exist in the
World Bank, and although quotas in the Bank do not provide access to credits (as
they do in the IMF), they do determine the Bank's lending policies.
Both in the IMF and the Bank, the United States has slightly more than the
twenty-percent interest needed for veto power (present rules require an 80 percent
vote for certain key decisions), and is not anxious to reduce its interest. The third
world seeks a change to 45 percent for the developed countries, 15 percent for
OPEC nations and 40 percent for the balance of the developing world. (It has
been reported that the IMF Interim Committee has reached tentative agreement
to increase OPEC's collective share to 10 percent by reducing the shares of the
United States and Great Britain; but it seems doubtful that the U.S. would accept
a share of less than 20 percent.)

'rThe SDR is based on an average of sixteen countries' currencies weighted according to their
importance in world trade, and tends to cushion inflation in exchange rates. In mid-1975, an SDR
was worth about $1.20.
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Among other things, developed countries are urged to assist in developing
scientific and technological infrastructures of developing countries; to contribute
to establishing an industrial technological bank; and to establish an international
center for the exchange of technological information. International and national
policies are also to be formulated to prevent "brain drain" from developing
nations.
Of specific interest are the following provisions regarding legal aspects of transferring technology:
1. Co-operation by all countries in the development of an international code of
conduct for transfer of technology, work now being done with UNCTAD to be
concluded in time for decisions at its Fourth Session in May, 1976, including a
decision on the legal character of such code, with the objective of the adoption of
a code of conduct prior to the end of 1977. The United States is opposed to a
legally binding code of conduct.
2. Review and revision of international conventions on patents and trade
marks to meet the special needs of developing nations.
3. National patent systems to be brought into line with the proposed revised
international patent system.
Industrialization
The most significant action taken by the Session in the area of industrialization
was its outright endorsement (subject to United States reservations on certain
points) of the "Lima Declaration and Plan of Action on Industrial Development
Co-operation" which was adopted in March, 1975 by the Second General Conference of UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization).
UNIDO 7 established in 1967 to promote and accelerate the industrial growth of
developing nations is, like the General Assembly and certain other groups,
dominated by the votes of the third world. Its moderates aim at a 25 percent share
by the developing countries in world industrial production by the year 2000; its
extremists pursue the politics of confrontation and blame:
... remaining vestiges of alien and colonial domination ... and neo-colonialism ...
continue to be among the greatest obstacles to ... progress of the developing countries
[Art. 9 of the aforementioned "Declaration"]
The "Declaration and Plan of Action," a lengthy document consisting of 76
paragraphs, includes the following:
1. A call upon all nations to adhere to the "Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States" (adopted by the General Assembly in December, 1974). The

'he Seventh Special Session approved conversion of UNIDO from a "related agency" to a
"specialized agency" of the U.N., with probable effect in late 1976 or early 1977.
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"Charter" has been described as a "list of developing country 'rights' and
developed country 'duties'," and contains provisions unacceptable to many
Western nations. Among these are provisions approving the formation of intergovernmental producer cartels and the right to expropriate foreign holdings upon
payment made in accordance with domestic law rather than "accepted norms of
international law."
2. A call for some form of indexing between export prices of developing countries and prices of imports from developed countries (see above, International
Trade, 3).
3. A call for greater use of producers' associations by commodity-exporting
countries, and consultation and co-operation amongst them for joint action to
strengthen their negotiating position vis-a-vis the developed countries, establish
prices and control production.
4. A call for measures to limit production of synthetics directly competitive
with developing countries' raw materials.
5. Prohibition of retaliation against "exercise of sovereignty" over (e.g.) marketing of resources; or, in other words, against cartels.
The resolution also calls for redeployment of developing countries of industry
which is "less competitive internationally" (e.g., because of high domestic labor
costs).
Food and Agriculture
Emphasizing that the solution to world food shortages lies primarily in rapidly
increasing the food production of developing countries, the Report seeks
developed country policies aimed at ensuring adequate supplies of reasonablypriced fertilizers and other agricultural inputs to developing countries; calls upon
developed countries (and developing ones so able) to pledge substantial amounts
to bring the International Fund for Agricultural Development (proposed by the
United States) into existence by the end of this year with assets of SDRs one
billion; and urges creation of a world food grain reserve large enough to cover
foreseeable shortfalls (the U.S. proposes reserves of 30 million tons of wheat and
rice, holdings to be spread amongst various countries on the basis of wealth,
production and trade).
Restructuring of the Economic and Social Sectors of
the United Nations System
Although more than 80 percent of the $1.5 billion now spent by the United
Nations system (exclusive of the international financial institutions) is devoted
to economic and social activity, there is widespread dissatisfaction with the
competent constitutional structure, and particularly ECOSOC and its subsidiary groups. There are two reasons: bureaucratic inefficiency; and failure of
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ECOSOC and its substructure to deal effectively with the problems of the developing nations.
One result has been creation by the General Assembly of quasi-organs of the
United Nations in replacement of many ECOSOC functions. One of such
organs, UNCTAD, with 150 member nations, is primarily concerned with the
economic problems of developing countries, and reports directly to the General
Assembly.8
The United Nations system today embraces 12 organizations and operational
programs, 5 regional commissions, 14 specialized agencies (plus the International Atomic Energy Agency) a multiplicity of special funds, various semi-autonomous bodies within the central secretariat, not to mention several hundred
intergovernmental committees, co-ordinating bodies and ad hoc groups. 9 No
less than 175 bodies now report to ECOSOC, and 36 senior officials report to
the Secretary-General.
In December, 1974, the 29th Session of the General Assembly asked the Secretary-General to convene a small group of high-level experts to study and
opropose changes in the United Nations aimed at improving international economic development. This diverse group--consisting of 25 experts including
Professor Richard N. Gardner (Columbia Law School) as Reporter and Al Noor
Kassum (Tanzania) as President-unanimously agreed upon a restructuring
scheme.
The expert's report, which does not entirely please any one group, will be one
of the sources for study by the ad hoc committee of the whole appointed by the
Seventh Special Session to prepare proposals for submission to the 31st Session of
the Assembly in the Fall of 1976.
Briefly, the experts recommend:
1.Creation of the post of Director-General for Development and International Economic Co-operation heading up the entire U.N. economic system,
and second in rank only to the Secretary-General.
2. Consolidation of all special purpose U.N. funds (except UNICEF) into a
single U.N. Development Authority, under one of two deputies to the DirectorGeneral.
3. Reorganization and revitalization of ECOSOC to enable it to exercise its
Charter duties of providing central policy guidance on economic and social
matters. ECOSOC's commissions and subordinate bodies would, for the most
part, be abolished and ECOSOC would assume direct responsibility.
4. Closer ties between GATT and the U.N.-including a formal relation-

However, the governing body of UNCTAD-the Trade and Development Board-reports to
ECOSOC!
'"A New United Nations Structure for Global Economic Co-operation," E/AC. 62/9, p. 4 (1975).
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ship-followed by the gradual phasing out of UNCTAD subject to the establishment of a comprehensive new International Trade Organization 10 which would,
in effect, combine the operations of GATT and UNCTAD.
5. Various housekeeping changes, including a commitment to excellence in
staff selection.
Elimination of UNCTAD, known to many as the "beggars' opera," will be
difficult, not only because of its own entrenched bureaucracy, but also because
of its popularity as a sounding board for the automatic third-world majority.
L. Robert Primoff
New York, New York

'l'he ITO envisaged by the Havana Charter immediately after World War II was rejected by the
United States.
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